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FLIGHT DECK EVOLUTION
EXTERNAL VISION
WORKLOAD
FAILURE MANAGEMENT
PILOT INCAPACITATION
FLIGHT MANAGEMENT COMPUTER & MAP
AUTOMATED MONITORING
INTEGRATED CAUTION AND WARNING
QUIET DARK CONCEPT
SIMPLIFIED CREW ACTION
COLOR CRT DISPLAYS
DEDICATED CREW REST AREA
INCREASED REDUNDANCY
CENTRALIZED MAINTENANCE COMPUTERS
IMPROVED FLIGHT MANAGEMENT
DIGITAL ELECTRONICS
(HIGH REUABIUTY)
AIRLINE WORKING
GROUP INPUT
FLIGHT DECK DESIGN GOALS
747-400
THE DESIGN OF THE 747 FLIGHT DECK IS BASED ON THE RECENT SUCCESSFUL
757/767 PROGRAMS AS WELL AS ON THE EXPERIENCE GAINED FROM MILLIONS OF
FLIGHT HOURS ON BOEING COMMERCIAL JET TRANSPORTS. SPECIAL EMPHASIS IS
PLACED ON THE LATEST DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND CONTROL/DISPLAY INTEGRATION
TO PROVIDE UNCLUTTERED INSTRUMENT PANELS, IMPROVED REACH AND SCAN
CAPABILITY, AND OPTIMIZED CREW WORKLOAD. THE RESULT IS ENHANCED SAFETY
AND PRODUCTIVITY THROUGH IMPROVED CREW COMFORT, PERFORMANCE, AND
WORKLOAD OPTIMIZATION.
GOALS TECHNOLOGY
• ENHANCED SAFETY
• IMPROVED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES
• PERFORMANCE/WORKLOAD OPTIMIZATION
• INCREASED RELIABILITY/MAINTAINABILITY
• REDUCED OPERATING COST
• IMPROVED CREW COMFORT
• DIGITAL COMPUTERS/MICROPROCESSORS
• INTEGRATED DISPLAYS
• INTEGRATED FLIGHT MANAGEMENT
• CDU's
• LASER GYRO INERTIAL REFERENCE
• ADVANCED SYSTEM MONITORING
• CENTRAL MAINTENANCE SYSTEM WITH
STANDARDIZED BITE
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FLIGHT DECK DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
INDUSTRY
• AIRLINE INPUT • AIAA
• FAA STUDIES • ARINC
• NASA STUDIES • RTCA
• NTSB • ICAO
• SAERECOMMENDATIONS • ALPA, IFALPA, APA
• ATA • MISC. STUDIES (1969 UAL-ALPA)
• FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION • A S RS
• COMPETITIVE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURE ° MILITARY - AIR FORCE, NAVY, ETC.
• SYMPOSIUMS • HUMAN FACTOR ORGANIZATIONS
• WORKSHOPS
• ACCIDENT/INCIDENT DATA
• BOEING FLIGHT TEST
• CREW TRAINING
• BOEING IR & D
BOEING
• CUSTOMER SERVICE UNIT
• DATA ON EXISTING BOEING MODELS
• RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY
• QUESTIONNAIRES TO AIRLINES
FunctionsAllocatedto Crew
• Guidance
• Control
• Separation
• Navigation
• Systems Operation
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DESIGN PHILOSOPHY
• CREW OPERATION SIMPLICITY
• EQUIPMENT REDUNDANCY
• AUTOMATED FEATURES
SimplicityThroughDesignRefinement
Wing Fuel Tank Development-Example
Wing Structure Weight
Fuel System Weight
Total Weight
Original 5-Tank Revised
3-Tank Proposal 3-Tank
1 I I
£ £ £
Jan '78 Jun '79 Jan '80
Base Large Decrease Large Decrease
Base Moderate Increase Small Increase
Base Moderate Decrease Large Decrease
Crew Operation Simple More Complex Simple
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REDUNDANCY
(EXAMPLES)
TRIPLEX
• INERTIAL REFERENCE SYSTEMS
ELECTRONIC FLIGHT INSTRUMENT SYMBOL GENERATION
° AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL AND FLIGHT DIRECTOR SYSTEM
• ILS RECEIVERS
DUAL
FLIGHT AND ENGINE INSTRUMENTS
• FLIGHT MANAGEMENT COMPUTER
• NAVIGATION RADIOS
• COMMUNICATION RADIOS
AIR DATA SYSTEMS
• WARNING AND CAUTION ALERTS
AUTOMATION
(WHAT DOES IT MEAN?)
SUBSYSTEM AUTOMATION
REDUCE CREW WORKLOAD (3 TO 2 MAN CREW)
REDUCE CREW ERROR
GLASS COCKPITS
REDUCE CREW ERROR AND ACCIDENTS
IMPROVE PILOT SCAN
REDUCES COST
FLIGHT MANAGEMENT COMPUTERS
PROVIDE MAP INFORMATION
REDUCE FUEL BURN
REDUCE CREW ERROR
AUTOPILOT/AUTOTH ROTTLE
REDUCE WORKLOAD
REDUCE CREW ERROR
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Boeing FlightDeckDesignCommittee
Examples of Accident Data Reviewed
e Subsystem management accidents-worldwide air ca rriers 1968-1980
Accident Related Cause
• Crew omitted pitot heat
• Wrong position of standby power switch
o Flight engineer and captain conducted
unauthorized troubleshooting
• Electrical power switching not coordinated
with pilots
• Flight engineer shut off ground proxlmlty
• Faulty fuel management
• No leading edge flaps on takeoff
• Confusion over correct spoiler switch
position
• Crewman did not follow pilot's Instruction
• Mismanaged cabin pressure
Design
• Auto on with engine start
• Automated standby and essential power
• Simplified systems delete maintenance
functions
• Auto switching and load shedding-no crew
action required
• Shut off on forward panel In full view of both
pilots
• Auto fuel management with alert for low fuel,
wrong configuration, and imbalance
• Improved takeoff warning with digital
computer
• Dual electric spoiler control
• Full-time caution and warning system
• Dual auto system with auto switchover
Allocation of 747-200 Flight Engineer's Duties
to 747-400 Flight Crew
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SUBSYSTEM CONTROLS & INDICATION COMPARISON
747-400
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747 Procedure Comparison
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CREW CAUSED ACCIDENTS VS. AUTOMATION
ALL ACCIDENTS THRU 1988
WORLDWIDE COMMERCIAL JET FLEET --,1=,,- AUTOMATION
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ATTITUDE, HEADING HOLD, AUTOPILOT
VOR MODE ON AUTOPILOTG AR UND MODE
FLIGHT DIRECTOR
AUTOTHRO'n'LE
ALTITUDE HOLD AUTOPILOT
AUTO SPEED BRAKES
NERTIAL REFERENCE SYSTEM
7.39
707
1,01
727
VERTICAL SPEED AUTOPILOT
AUTOLAND
AUTO BRAKES
FLAP LOAD REL EF
AUTO FUEL MANAGEMENT
AUTO GENERATOR MANAGEMENT
AUTO AIR CONDITIONING
AUTO PRESSURIZATION
AUTO STANDBY POWER
_C_QNE£_.LWH EE L STEERING .............
I FULL AUTOPILOT
I FLIGHT MANAGEMENT COMPUTER (SINGLE)
IGLASS COCKPIT
t INERTIAL REFERENCE L)NIT,_
2.85 ELECTRONIC ENGINE CONTROL '
_-_ [_ FLIGHT MANAGEMENT COMPUTER (DUAL)
LATE RAL & VERTICAL NAVIGATION AUTOP,LOT
1.49 FULL AuTO SUBSYSTEMS
AUTO CAUTION & WARNING
QUIET/DARK COCKPIT
.54 .49 I EFIS/EICAS
[_ _ I AUTOIGNITIONLWI_I_ ALERT
747 737 737 757/767
-100/-200 -300/-400
AUTOMATION
(THE GOOD AND BAD)
THE PLUSES
SAFETY
ERROR REDUCTION
WORKLOAD REDUCTION
SIMPLIFIED CREW OPERATION
COST SAVINGS
THE PROBLEMS
REDUCE CREW UNDERSTANDING
(AUTO-MANUAL)
CREW OVERUSE REDUCING CREW FALL-BACK CAPABILITY
PILOT TRANSITION IN AND OUT OF AUTOMATIC AIRPLANES
BOREDOM
DESIGNER's INTENT NOT TRANSMITTED TO PILOT
.... '"'_- PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
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